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Social organization in the Minority Game model
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We study the role of imitation within the Minority Game model of market. The players can exchange
information locally, which leads to formation of groups which act as if they were single players. Co-
herent spatial areas of rich and poor agents result. We found that the global effectivity is optimized
at certain value of the imitation probability, which decreases with increasing memory length. The
social tensions are suppressed for large imitation probability, but generally the requirements of high
global effectivity and low social tensions are in conflict.
PACS numbers: 05.65.+b; 02.50.Le; 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
The last decade witnessed the increasing effort of
physicists to formulate various aspects of social sciences
in the language of natural sciences, namely bring them
close to physics. Among numerous applications we can
mention for example traffic flow [1,2], city growth [3],
human trail system [4], geometry of social networks [5,6]
economic returns of research [7] and so on.
Perhaps the most prominent example of this effort is
the field of econophysics [8,9]. Among various attempts
to grasp the nature of economic behavior the modeling
of systems of heterogeneous adaptive agents reached high
popularity. One of the basic models is the Minority Game
[10,11] introduced by Challet and Zhang.
In the Minority Game (MG) we have N players who
choose repeatedly between two options and compete to be
in the minority group. This is the idealization of various
situations, where the competition for limited resources
leads to intrinsic frustration. One can think for exam-
ple of cars choosing between two alternative routes or a
speculator who tries to earn money by buying and sell-
ing shares in such a manner that the majority takes the
opposite action than herself.
The players share a public information, saying what
were the outcomes of the game in past M rounds. The
players interact only through this information. There-
fore, the system has a “mean-field” character, in the sense
that no short-range interactions exist.
The self-organization is achieved by allowing players
to have several strategies and choose among them the
strategy which seems to be the best one. This feature
leads to decrease of the fluctuations of attendance below
its random coin-tossing value, thus increasing the global
effectivity of the system. It was found that the relevant
parameter is α = 2M/N and the maximum effectivity is
reached for α = αc ≃ 0.34 [11–13].
It was established that a phase transition occurs at
this value of the parameter α and its properties were
thoroughly studied both numerically [14] and analytically
[15]. The Minority Game and its variants were inten-
sively studied by several groups. We are able to give
only an incomplete list of references [16–26]. Among the
various ramifications, we would like to mention especially
the attempts to go back to the economic motivations of
MG and model the market mechanisms [27–29].
The purpose of the present work is to investigate the
properties of social structures, which can emerge if we
go beyond the mean-field character of the usual MG and
allow a local information exchange. Related works were
already done, either assuming that the global information
is fully replaced by a local one [30] or using the MG
scheme for evolving the Kauffmans’s boolean networks
[31] to the critical state [32].
Here we want to study the effect of imitations. Indeed,
it is quite common that people do not invest individually,
but rely on an advice from specialized agencies, or sim-
ply follow the trend they perceive in their information
neighborhood. In so doing, the individuals coalesce into
groups, which act as single players. In the framework
of Minority Game, we will study the social structure in-
duced by the occurence of these groups.
II. MINORITY GAME WITH IMITATION
We introduce the possibility of local information ex-
change in our variant of the Minority Game. To this
end, we should assume some properties of the informa-
tion network underlaying the “information metabolism”,
in analogy to the metabolic pathways in living organisms.
The study of the geometry of information networks is now
a scientific field on its own [5,6,33]. Within the frame-
work of MG a linear chain [30] and random network with
fixed connectivity K [32] was already investigeted in dif-
ferent contexts. Here we assume the simplest geometry,
namely we will place the players on a linear chain with
nearest-neighbor connections. We will simplify the net-
work even more by suposing, that the information flow
is not symmetric and each player can obtain informa-
tion only from her left-hand neighbor. In the rest of
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the article, by “neighbor” we always mean the left-hand
neighbor. Each player can read the information about
her neighbors’ wealth.
There wil be two conditions needed for a player to im-
itate her neighbor. First, the player should have internal
disposition for being an imitator. We simplify the vari-
ety of risk-aversion levels by postulating only two types of
players. The imitator type (denoted 1) will always adopt
the strategy of her neighbor, if she finds it better. The
rest consists of the leader type (denoted 0) who always
uses her own strategies. In the whole population of N
players, there is the fraction p ∈ [0, 1] of the type 1 and
the rest is of the type 0. The case p = 0 corresponds to
the usual MG.
The second condition for the player of the type 1 to ac-
tually imitate in the current step is that her neighbor has
larger accumulated wealth than the player itself. We sup-
pose that the played does not know what are the strate-
gie of her neighbor, but if she observes that the neigh-
bor’s behavior is more profitable than her own strategy,
she relegates the decision to the neighbor and takes the
same action. The player of the type 0 will never imitate.
Therefore, she will always look only at her S strategies
and choose the best estimate from them.
The above rules are formalized as follows. We follow
mostly the notation of [15]. There are totally N players.
We will take always N as an odd number. Each player
has S = 2 strategies, denoted sj ∈ {1, 2}.
We denote the two possible actions a player can take
+1 and −1. The winning action is +1 if most players
took −1 and vice versa. The players know the last M
outcomes of the game. This information is arranged into
the M -bit string µ ∈ {−1,+1}M. The strategies are
tables attributing to each of 2M possible strings µ the
action aµj,sj the player j takes, if she chooses the strategy
sj . The scores Uj,s of the strategies are updated accord-
ing to the minority rule
Uj,s(t+ 1) = Uj,s(t)− a
µ(t)
s,j sign
∑
i
ai(t) (1)
where aj(t) is the action the player j takes at time t.
Up to this moment the algoritm was identical to the
usual MG. We introduce a new feature, the imitation,
into the rule determining what are the actions taken by
the players, depending on their wealths and on the scores
of their strategies.
Each player has a label l˜ ∈ {1, 0} indicating, whether
the player is potentially an imitator (l˜ = 1) or always a
leader (l˜ = 0). The labels are random but quenched. At
the beginning we take each of the players and attribute
her the label 1 with probability p and label 0 with prob-
ability 1− p.
Denote Wj the wealth of the j-th player. Then, if the
label l˜j = 1 and Wj−1 > Wj , then j will take the same
action as j − 1, so aj = aj−1. Therefore, wee need to es-
tablish aj−1 first and we proceed recurrently by iterating
this rule. On the other hand, if l˜j = 0 or Wj−1 ≤ Wj ,
the action will be aj = aj,sM , where sM denotes the most
successfull strategy at the moment, Uj,sM = maxs Uj,s,
as in the usual MG.
This can be written formally by introducing the vari-
ables lj describing the actual state of imitation, in anal-
ogy with the labels l˜j describing potential state of imita-
tion. We can write lj = l˜j θ(Wj−1 −Wj), with θ(x) = 1
for x > 0 and 0 othervise. The actions are
aj = ljaj−1 + (1− lj)aj,sM . (2)
We also suppose that the imitation is not for free. The
player who imitates passes a small fraction ε of its wealth
increase to the imitated player. This rule accounts for the
price of information. We used the value ε = 0.05. Then,
we update the wealth of players iteratively,
∆Wj(t) = (1− εlj)(εlj+1 ∆Wj+1(t)− aj sign
∑
i
ai(t))
(3)
where ∆Wj(t) = Wj(t+ 1)−Wj(t).
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FIG. 1. Time dependence of the fraction of imitating play-
ers for the number of players is N = 1001 and memoryM = 6.
The imitation probabilities p are 0.99 (solid line), 0.95 (dashed
line), and 0.8 (dash-dotted line).
In numerical simulations we observe that the number
of actually imitating players, Ni =
∑
j lj , grows until it
saturates at a value slightly below the upper bound pN .
It means that it is always beneficiary for some potential
imitators not to imitate but rely on their own strategies.
The time dependence of the fraction of imitators Ni/N
for three values of p is shown in Fig. 1.
The initially random distribution of wealth among
players changes qualitatively during the evolution of the
system. Coherent groups of poor and wealthy players are
formed. An example of the time evolution of the spatial
wealth distribution is given in Fig. 2.
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FIG. 2. Example of the evolution of the distribution of
wealth among players, for p = 1. The time step at which the
snapshot is taken is indicated on the right. For each time, the
vertical axis indicates the wealth Wj of the j’th player.
III. GLOBAL EFFECTIVITY AND LOCAL
SOCIAL TENSIONS
The Minority Game is a negative-sum game. The aver-
age gain of the players reaches its maximum, if the atten-
dance A =
∑
j
1
2 (aj+1) is closest possible toN/2. So, the
time averaged attendance fluctuations σ2 = 〈(A−N/2)2〉
measure the distance from the global optimum. The
global effectivity is higher for smaller σ2.
We investigated the influence of the imitation on the
global effectivity. In the usual MG (which corresponds to
p = 0) the fluctuations depend on the memory and num-
ber of players through the scaling variable α = 2M/N .
This fact can be observed through the data collapse of
the results for various N ’s. We tried to find the same
data collapse for a non-zero p. Figure 3 shows such a
plot for p = 0.8. We can see that the dependence of
σ2/N on α has a minimum as in the usual MG, but the
critical value αc of the scaling parameter is lower while
the value of the flucuations at the minimum is higher.
In the symetry-broken phase (α > αc) the data collapse
is good. On the other hand, significant deviations are
observed in the crowded (symmetric) phase, which are
more pronounced for smaller α. On the other hand, for
larger value of imitation probability, the data still scale
with α = 2M/N , but the collapse is poorer in the whole
range of α. The situation for p = 0.99 is shown in Fig. 4.
We can see that if we decrease α in the symmetric phase,
the fluctuations increase first, but contrary to the usual
MG a local maximum is reached and when decreasing α
further, the fluctuations are suppressed.
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FIG. 3. Dependence of the attendance fluctuations on the
scaling variable 2M/N , for p = 0.8 and system sizes N = 1001
(×), 601 (⊙), and 401 (△).
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FIG. 4. Dependence of the attendance fluctuations on
the scaling variable 2M/N , for p = 0.99 and system sizes
N = 1001 (×), 601 (⊙), and 401 (△).
We tried also another data collapse, namely the de-
pendence of σ2/Nsσ on 2
MsM/N for various p, where
sM and sσ are scaling parameters depending on p, cho-
sen so that the best possible data collapse is achieved.
For convenience we require sM = sσ = 1 for p = 0.
With this choice, the scaling parameters have the follow-
ing interpretation. The location minimum of attendance
fluctuations is shifted from its usual value αc(0) = 0.34
valid for p = 0 to αc(p) = αc(0)/sM , while the value
of σ2/N in the minimum is increased by the factor sσ.
We can see the results in Fig. 5. We again observe
good collapse in the symmery-broken regime, while in
the symmetric phase there is no collapse, but systematic
decrease, stronger for higher p, is observed.
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FIG. 5. Rescaled atendance fluctuations. The number of
players is N = 1001 and the imitation probabilities p are 0
(•), 0.6 (×), 0.8 (+), 0.9 (△), 0.95 (⊙), 0.97 (✷), and 0.99
(✸). Inset: dependence of the scaling parameters sM (+) and
sσ (×) on p.
Nevertheless, the parameters sM and sσ still bear the
information about the shift of the minimum. We can see
their dependence on p in the inset of Fig. 5. The data
suggest that both of the parameters diverge as a power
law when p→ 1.
We investigated also the dependence of the attendance
fluctuations (and therefore the global effectivity) on the
imitation probability for fixed number of players and
memory. We found that in the crowded phase the system
becomes more effective if imitation is allowed (p > 0), but
there is a local minimum in the dependence of σ2/N on
p, indicating that there is an optimal level of imitation,
beyond which the system starts to perform worse. The
results for N = 1001 are shown in Fig. 6. We can see
that the minimum occurs at smaller values for larger M .
We can also observe that for longer memories (M = 7 in
our case) the value of the fluctuations for p = 1 is signif-
icantly above the value vithout imitation (p = 0), while
the value at the minimum still lies below the p = 0 value.
This implies that moderate imitation can be beneficiary,
while exaggerated one can be harmful.
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FIG. 6. Dependence of the attendance fluctuations on the
imitation probability. The number of players is N = 1001 and
memory length M = 5 (⊙), M = 6 (+), and M = 7 (×).
The increase of spatial coherence in poor and wealthy
groups seen qualitatively in Fig. 2 can result in decrease
of social tension. Indeed, the individuals can exchange
information about their wealth only among neighbors. If
most of the individuals perceive small local wealth gra-
dient, the social tensions will be also small. To quantify
the social tension, we should introduce a sort of “utility
function” [34] U(∆W ), which indicates, how much the
wealth difference ∆W is subjectively perceived. As usual,
any realistic utility function should have negative second
derivative. This feature, called risk aversion in standard
economics literature, expresses in our case the intuitively
obvious fact that smaller differences in living standards
are relatively more significant than larger differences: I
could be more happy if I succeeded in shrinking the wage
distance to my rival employee from 500 $ to 400 $ than
from 55,500 $ to 55,400 $.
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We will use the utility function in the form U(x) = xb.
Realistic values of the exponent are b < 1. However, we
will use also the values b = 1 and b = 2 for comparison.
Then, the global measure of the local social tension is
db =
1
〈W 〉


N−1∑
j=1
|Wj −Wj+1|
b


1/b
(4)
where we denoted the average wealth 〈W 〉 = 1N
∑N
j=1Wj .
The results for various values of the exponent b are
shown in Fig. 7. We can see that the behavior for all
b except b = 2 is qualitatively similar. When increasing
p, the social tension increases first, but then decreases
again and for p→ 1 it reaches a point below its value for
p = 0. Hence, large enough imitation will decrease the
social tension. On the other hand, for b = 2 we observe
further increase when p approaches to 1. Therefore, if
the utility was measured by exponent b = 2 (which would
hold for risk-seeking adventurers), the tension would only
increase due to imitation.
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FIG. 7. Relative local tension for N = 1001, M = 6, mea-
sured by utility function (∆W )b with exponents b = 0.3 (+),
b = 0.5 (×), b = 0.7 (✷), b = 1 (⊙), and b = 2 (△).
The most striking result comes from comparison of Fig
6 (for M = 6) and Fig 7. We can see that both the local
maxima of σ2/N and the local minima of db for b < 1
lie at the endpoints of the interval [0,1]. Therefore, if we
want to optimize the social tensions by some process in-
voving small gradual changes of p, we will finish in one of
the endpoints, depending on the initial value of p. Among
the two stable points, the optimum is located at p = 1.
However, the stable points (including the absolute op-
timum of the local tension) are simultaneously local min-
ima of the global effectivity: we observe a clear conflict
of interest between local and global views.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated the creation of rich and poor spa-
tial domains due to local information exchange, within
the framework of the Minority Game. The introduction
of imitation among players leads to creation of groups,
which act in accord. For fixed imitation probability p we
found that the attendance fluctuations still depend on
the scaling variable α = 2M/N in the symmery-broken
phase, while in the symmetric phase there are systematic
deviations from the data collapse.
The characteristic minimum in the dependence of fluc-
tuations on α persist in our modification of the Minority
Game, but the location of the minimum decreases and
the value at the minimum increases when increasing p.
We found that both quantities depend as a power law on
1− p.
We found that in the symmetric phase the introduction
of imitation can lead to absolute decrease of the atten-
dance fluctuations and thus to increase in global system
effectivity. There is an optimal value of the imitation,
which increases with decreasing M .
The creation of coherent areas of poor and rich agents
leads to decrease in the local social tensions, but only if
p is sufficiently close to 1. The lowest value of the social
tension is reached at p = 1, but for such a value the
global effectivity is significantly lower than its optimum
value. Therefore, we observe a conflict of local interests
(minimization of social tension) with global performance
(minimization of attendance fluctuations).
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